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ABSTRACT
This study examines the conditions under which militias embroiled in civil war choose to
disarm. This study argues that militias more invested in domestic politics rather than
engaging in regional rivalries, are more likely to choose to disarm voluntarily. The
results show that after examining seven different militias in the context of the Lebanese
Civil War (1975-1990), religious affiliation is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition
to cause the drastic difference in the outcome of voluntary disarmament. The theory is
proven correct when accounting for domestic and international relationships and militia
commitment to operating within a particular level of analysis.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL INFORMATION
Militias take many forms in many types of authoritarian or democratic states,
during both times of war and peace. They most often emerge however in times of civil
war and strife. Whether they emerge in the context of ethnic insurrections or focus on
foreign intervention, militias are defined as “a very extensive more or less voluntary
cooperation of the whole mass of the people,” that are auxiliary to the common, and often
legitimate, state forces. 1 The role of a paramilitary or militia group in a state’s society can
vary. Militia and rebel groups are concerned with governing over territory and the people
who compose that territory, while systematically dismissing any other groups, including
the rule of the legitimate state. 2 Militias also take on the role of defending local
populations from the imposition of other groups or protecting a population from attacks
from others, while attempting to gain devotion and different levels of participation from
the citizenry.3 Militias can be exploitative in the way they operate, using their power and
community status to coerce civilians into supporting their legitimacy. They may seek to
gain that devotion by appealing to their population, securing their societal wellbeing
through both social programming and, when necessary, lethal force. 4 States and the
international body at large often view militias as invalid entities despite the state-like
structure they seem to supply towards a population. Militias are at times stripped

Corinna Jentzsch et al. “Militias in Civil Wars.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59, no. 5 (2015): 757.
Ibid., 756.
3 Ibid,.
4 Ibid., 758.
1
2
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forcefully of their arms and made to acquiesce to the state. Assumptions about militias
would indicate that they would be able to overcome such attempts through their
militarized capabilities, however, is it possible for militia groups to simply decide to give
up their use of force? Under what circumstances do militias choose to disarm?
Disarmament is a component of a more considerable effort to put an end to civil
war hostilities.5 This process is varied but can appear fundamentally different in various
civil wars contexts. Puzzling variation exists among the process of disarmament in militia
groups. While many come to an agreement based on terms of a formalized treaty, e.g., the
IRA in Ireland, there are not many clear examples of voluntary disarmament.
Furthermore, it is difficult to determine exactly when militia groups disarm voluntarily.
The underlying elements of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process
(DDR) dictates that peace is crucially contingent on disarmament - DDR is the most
significant indicator of a willingness to cooperate with the terms of peace. 6 Disarmament
is a critical component of achieving a successful process of peace negotiations, and
ultimately, a lasting peace. The Taif Accords that ended the Lebanese civil war resulted
in various outcomes for the many different militias. The majority of the militias chose to
disarm, including all the militias in the Lebanese Front coalition as well as most militias
in the Lebanese National Movement such as the Mourabitoun, Amal, and other smaller
factions. Hezbollah, the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) and Marada chose not to do so
as a result of their relationships with external states and more broad regional activity with

David E. Cunningham, et al. “It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome.”
Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 4 (Aug 2009): 579.
6 Angel Rabasa et al. From Insurgency to Stability. Rand Corporation, 2011: 53.
5
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Iran, Syria, and Israel. Through the framework of civil war cessation, ending of
hostilities, and reintegration of the state, this study argues that under the condition that
militias embroiled in civil war are more focused on the resolution of domestic political
disputes rather than on engaging in regional rivalries and external conflict beyond the
state, we expect to see militias choose to disarm. When a militia’s primary goal is
focused on resolving domestic civil conflict and reintegration and peace within the
territorial confines of the state, militia groups will choose to disarm voluntarily due to
their commitment to the state status quo. Under the conditions, then, of wanting to be
involved with other regional conflicts or deeper involvement with other neighboring
conflicts rather than focus on resolving the domestic political situation, militias will not
choose to disarm.
Other studies have focused on the behavior of militias during and after the
negotiating process, however excluding key elements represented in many civil wars.
Theory 1 argues that the strength of a strong insurgency prevents a formalized peace
process through DDR, therefore allowing militias to choose not to disarm as they can
overrule any barriers to strategic bargaining with sheer military strength. 7 Theory 2
claims that insurgent groups rely on a fractured domestic system of politics; militias will
seek legitimacy by exploiting a power-sharing and deeply divided regime structure to
shield themselves from broader international condemnation to disarm, and to be
perceived as an active member of the state’s civil society. 8 These arguments, while

Govinda Clayton. “Relative rebel strength and the onset and outcome of civil war mediation.” Journal of
Peace Research 50, no. 5 (Sep 2013): 620.
8 Eva Dingel. “Hezbollah's Rise and Decline? How the Political Structure Seems to Harness the Power of
Lebanon's Non-State Armed Group.” Security and Peace 31, no. 2 (2013): 72.
7

3

necessary to inform the process of disarmament, do not include elements of international
influence in the process and the consequences of the militia’s role as a para-state, and
view the achievement of peace as limited to the state government and the militias
involved, lacking nuance in its categorization and limiting the scope of the discussion to a
normative discussion on the elements of the DDR process and the state in which it
occurs. While compelling, the arguments presented lack the ability to be applied to civil
war contexts outside the scope of just state-militia relationships, and do not profoundly
discuss power-sharing frameworks or third-party involvement in DDR processes despite
a historically large number of civil wars that can potentially be applied to such terms.
By using a method of difference approach, this paper seeks to explain how
militias chose to disarm willingly. The method of difference is made most useful when
considering the different factors that lead to disarmament, or the lack thereof. 9
Comparative methods of difference use asymmetric causal inferences in this study to
identify successful and unsuccessful militia disarmament, typically within the framework
of a change over time.10 Many cite excerpts of speeches of noteworthy actors in the given
circumstances, survey research conducted by third-party organizations, and governing
documents of particular regimes. The case of Lebanon's militia disarmament helps to
illustrate the conditions under which they choose to disarm voluntarily, as there are
examples of many militias that chose to voluntarily surrender during its lengthy civil war.

Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen. “Armed Conflict, 1989-2006.” Journal of Peace Research 44, no. 5
(Sep 2007): 625.
10 Alex Vines. “Disarmament in Mozambique.” Journal of Southern African Studies 24, no. 1 (Mar 1998):
193.
9
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Using qualitative comparative analysis through a method of difference is ideal to
examine the militias of the Lebanese civil war and examine the variables that lead to the
discrepancy in the outcome of voluntary or involuntary disarmament. By utilizing case
studies on militias and a collection of archival records, this study will corroborate its
claims through conducted interviews with two militia members who were active during
the civil war in order to provide additional support to case study discussions. The
significance of including active militia members in this discussion stems from a desire to
communicate the reality of the day-to-day that militia members engaged in, and a unique
perspective offered by looking back upon the years in which they engaged in conflict,
especially after so long.
The period of the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990), therefore, is most effective in
understanding the DDR process. This study will seek to examine that it is not simply the
access and use of small arms and light weapons, religious disparities in a power-sharing
ethnoconfessional system, and foreign actors that determine voluntary disarmament.
Rather, this study will argue that it is the commitment to a state’s domestic structure,
whether or not it is a fractured or ethnoconfessional in nature, or a commitment to a
larger regional patron state’s interests to engage in the international sphere that dictates
the likelihood of voluntary disarmament. This study will do so through a narrative
discussion of many militias that were present during the war period. This study carries
vital implications in small arms and light weapons reduction for militias currently
embroiled in civil war. Implications of this study can strengthen current understanding
about what incentivizes militias to disarm in a unique manner, broaden the discussion on

5

the effective and ineffective elements of DDR for use in future civil war negotiation, and
impact public policy geared at militant non-state actors more broadly by discussing the
competing elements of state preservation and external regional partnerships.
Additionally, no existing studies have successfully distinguished between the act
of disarmament and a desire or choice for militias to disarm. Authors discuss that for
certain DDR approaches, alternative strategies geared at achieving peace can be
approached only through a formalized peace process, such as in Afghanistan where
disarmament is suggested as being unlikely due to the security dilemma that imbues the
conflict.11 While accurate to the predicated understanding of militias not ever being
disincentivized to disarm in general, it does not describe or detail any form of voluntary
disarmament, as it is assumed to be useless or pointless in its conception. 12 Others argue
that a concrete measure of security in communities with active militias is necessary to
create even a basic willingness to disarm, however, it is again assumed that there is no
willingness to disarm outside of the realm of formalized processes or any factors external
to the classic interpretation of the security dilemma as applied to the DDR process and to
achieving peace among warring militias. 13 Most importantly, this incorporation of choice
and decision-making elements into the mix of militia disarmament literature is what
makes the approach distinct from current literature. With the violent implications of small
arms, a microscopic approach is a far more productive aim at a comparative analysis. It

Alpaslan Özerdem. "Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants in
Afghanistan: Lessons Learned from a Cross-Cultural Perspective." Third World Quarterly 23, no. 5 (2002):
963.
12 Ibid.,
13 James Bevan. Crisis in Karamoja: Armed Violence and the Failure of Disarmament in Uganda’s Most
Deprived Region. Report. Small Arms Survey, 2008, 63-64.
11
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is a counter-intuitive and interesting phenomenon to examine why a militia, which has
control over means of coercion, would voluntarily choose to surrender it in a post-conflict
environment and engage in the DDR process. This article seeks, in a broader scope, to
further distinguish that simple disarmament - i.e., getting rid of guns - is not the same as
the DDR process, nor is it the same as voluntarily disarmament.
Among many possible lenses with which to examine disarmament in terms of a
civil war, many examples are fitting, but that are not included for this study. While other
civil wars have many similar components to those highlighted in this research, Lebanon
provides a notable example to understand the process of disarmament, or otherwise, due
to the sheer number of militias that existed concurrently during the Lebanese civil war.
With a vast number of militias operating during the civil war, for similar or unique
reasons, the case of Lebanon allows us to explore an environment in which these many
militias all executed their various strategies and achieved different outcomes in the
discharging, or lack thereof, of their weapons. Additionally, the Lebanese civil war has
been resolved for many years, with a more complete historical framework where updated
information about the militias can be found more readily. Lebanon also serves as a
typical case that is generalizable to other sectarian conflicts in the MENA region, like
Syria and Iraq.
Lebanon's civil war is atypical in many distinct aspects in terms of militias.
While always being compared to the conflicts with Bosnia-Herzegovina and former
nations of Yugoslavia on a surface level, 14 Lebanon was drastically committed to a state

Florian Bieber. “Bosnia-Herzegovina and Lebanon: Historical Lessons of Two Multireligious States.”
Third World Quarterly 21, no. 2 (Apr 2000): 274.
14
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for at least two or three decades before engaging in civil war, making it an ideal choice to
examine elements of this theory related to a commitment to an already existing state, and
the domestic politics that come with it. The main conflict was how to integrate the many
different ethnoreligious groups or "para-states'' into a functioning regime in Bosnia.
Bosnia had been faced with a decisive desire of many ethnic groups to leave the united
collective state behind with the fall of Yugoslavia itself. 15 While Lebanon had militias
balancing each other out, the political system of Lebanon demanded that these militias
included members of other ethnoreligious groups, despite being composed
overwhelmingly by one religious identity at the time.
Additionally, the press reporting in Bosnia was controlled by internal state
measures or the Communist parties, whereas Lebanon's press was controlled heavily by
external and neighboring Arab states.16 While militias were similar in the ability to
provide necessary social services to their bases, the case in which the Lebanese civil war
is most distinct is due to the closest neighboring countries of Syria and Iran playing a
hand in a particular militia, an element not found in the Bosnian example. 17 While foreign
intervention was most certainly at play in the fall of former Yugoslavia, Lebanon holds a
more significant role in understanding the play between East and West, with many states
in the Middle East eager to push Lebanon to fully commit to the ideology and heritage of
the Near East. 18 This has fundamentally imbued Lebanese politics with a question of

Ibid., 272.
Ibid.,
17 Ibid., 275.
18 Rana Jawad. "Lebanon: A Profile of Political and Welfare Institutions." In Social Welfare and Religion
in the Middle East: A Lebanese Perspective, 69-84. Bristol, UK; Portland, OR, USA: Bristol University
Press, 2009, 70-71.
15
16
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commitment; in the case of active Lebanese militias, this question of commitment can be
applied to either a larger regional hegemon or the state itself.
The Lebanese civil war was composed of several phases, with some militias
active in different structures and alliances; however, all militias were participants to the
Taif accords in some form or fashion, whether or not they experienced splintering. The
narrative focus on these militias is placed on the outcome of all the militia groups before
and after Taif negotiations. The militias in this study did not necessarily engage in
combat or conflict with each other during every given year, nor did every militia group
operate during the same time frame in the war. The militias did not have to coexist in
order to arrive at the same negotiating table in Taif, and still, all militias active at any
stage were ultimately involved in the Lebanese civil war’s complex network. Most
militias during the war had involvement with foreign actors, but not all were serving in
the patron-client relationship between an external state and militia. Over time, some
militias defected from their root causes while others had continued relationships with
other regional actors. Focusing on the period leading up to the accords, the implication of
Taif itself, and the continuity of the militias that chose not to give up their arms is
significant in examining their decision to disarm or not. Disarmament was never certain
under the terms of the Taif accords for any or all militias. Some occurred after continued
pressure, while others chose not to follow the terms of the accords, or were exempt from
the terms altogether.
This study chooses not to focus on the different military groups that fractured
during the war, who chose to represent their respective association and ideological

9

alignments during the war rather than the institution of the Lebanese army as a whole.
The Army of Free Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces were, at one point, a part of
a larger state military; however, their legitimacy as an extension of the state makes them
difficult to categorize as militias. Key figures represented them during the war - Colonel
Antoine Barakat and General Michel Aoun, associated with their own military wings,
were heavily involved in the civil war and political environment at the time but their
involvement, while adjacent to the militias, does not constitute their military arms as
paramilitary groups or violent non-state actors.19 Additionally, while a dominant violent
non-state actor in the civil war, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) is not
included as a militia group in this study.
After the literature review, theory, and methods sections, the discussion will go as
follows. First, this study will address the contextual history of Lebanon. Second, this
study will discuss the history of the militias and their disarmament in the post-war peace
settlement, clearly defining their goals as either domestic or regional in nature. Lastly, the
discussion of the results will address the theory of this study and its validity examined
across rival theories.

19Nader

Moumneh. The Lebanese Forces: Emergence and Transformation of the Christian Resistance.
(Hamilton Books, Maryland, 2019): 159.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
The process of disarmament is rather complex and is more than the mere act of
disarmament as gleaned from its contextual understanding. The process of DDR is
necessary to achieve peace and - without all three components of disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration - it is impossible to put an end to civil war truly.20 The
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) defines disarmament
as, "...the collection, documentation, control, and disposal of small arms, ammunition,
explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian
population.”21 The simple disposal of arms, however, does not imply a willingness to
surrender them. DDR is a linear process that becomes increasingly more complex as time
passes in its efforts to create a negative peace in any given conflict, with a focus on an
immediate restoration of stability. It is beholden to the desire to achieve that peace or else
renege on terms, or bypass them altogether through strength. The linearity and timeline of
disarmament of a militia group - decommissioning the fighters, and reintegrating them
into society at large - is of utmost significance when the process is used and is what most
significantly distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary disarmament.22 The most
paramount focus of DDR is to reestablish a state’s monopoly of force. Some argue that
the primary goal of DDR is to create security at the community level and, in order to

United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. “Operational Guide to the Integrated
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards.” (2014)
21 Ibid.,
22 Angel Rabasa et al. From Insurgency to Stability. Rand Corporation, 2011: 53.
20
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achieve effective and long-lasting peace, DDR must focus more on community groups in
the post-conflict period. Communities are better receptive to peace when they feel safe
that crime and the continued acquisition of arms is being controlled without the threat of
the state abandoning their protection. 23 The incentive for a militia to opt for peace rather
than engage in costly conflict can only be secured through DDR, and engaging in the
process is a firm commitment to voluntary disarmament. A significant predicated factor
on the process of DDR is that some security will be achieved and will emerge after the
negotiations,24 since a guarantee of better and more secure outcomes will allow militia
members to develop a level of trust in hopes to permanently cease hostilities. 25 This
process of DDR can only be established after a basic cessation of hostilities, or an
immediate-term ceasefire is reached. Militias worry that, after the processes of disarming
and demobilizing, their loss in bargaining power can be turned against them without an
indisputable guarantee of security.26 To combat that temptation, a form of reintegration in
DDR called rebel-military integration (MI), allows many former militia members to
become a part of state or other occupations within the framework of a given society, such
as the state military, or jobs adjacent to the state’s military structure.27 Integration can
also occur outside the context of former militia members joining the state military.

Willemijn Verkoren et al. “From DDR to Security Promotion: Connecting National Programs to
Community Initiatives.” International Journal of Peace Studies 15, no. 2 (2010), 2-4.
24 Michael G. Findley. “Bargaining and the Interdependent Stages of Civil War Resolution.” The Journal
of Conflict Resolution 57, no. 5 (Oct 2013): 908.
25 Rabasa, et al., From Insurgency, 54.
26 Vellodi, M A. “Problems of Disarmament.” India International Centre Quarterly 6, no. 3 (July 1979):
210.
27 Katherine Glassmyer and Nicholas Sambanis. “Military Integration and Civil War Termination.”
Journal of Peace Research 45, no. 3 (May 2008) 365-366.
23
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Another popular strategy of reintegration occurs under the terms of giving up arms in
order to reintegrate into society at large, and terms of peace settlement can include
reinsertion assistance, which can include a “restart package” of funding or additional
resources to start businesses and establish an alternative way of maintaining a living
outside of the structure of a militia. 28 The goal of the DDR process is to reinforce the
notion that peace is a favored outcome for all members involved in militias, whether at
the community level or in the context of the ideological stance that their militias
defended. Reconciliation is proven much more difficult when hostility is high, with
hostility defined as (1) the number of warring militias, (2) whether the war is
ethnoreligious or confessional in nature, (3) the extent to which “ethnic fractionalization”
is pervasive,29 and (4) the total amount of deaths and displacements. 30 Reconciliation can
be achieved with substantial ease when there is an economic incentive for former
combatants to undergo the DDR process.31
Small arms and light weapons (SALW) are not often the subject of international
efforts to decommission weaponry. 32 Despite their pervasiveness and being the most
often used weapons in conflict, and despite the ability for SALW to be transported
discreetly from one conflict to another with ease and the lack of extensive and intensive
training needed to operate them, 33 SALW are often overlooked in broader international

Verkoren et al., “From DDR…,” 1-2.
Craig R. Whitney. “Ruling Arms.” World Policy Journal 29, no. 4 (2012/2013): 91.
30 Glassmyer and Sambanis, “Military Integration…”, 368
31 Ibid., 367.
32 David B. Kopel et al. “Micro-Disarmament: The Consequences for Safety and Human Rights.” (2005).
33 Vines, “Disarmament in…,” 194.
28
29
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discussions of disarmament, with weapons of mass destruction holding a more prominent
role in disarmament treaties and discussions.34 The proliferation and removal of SALW
from insurgent groups is integrated into a process of security sector reform, which would
allow for voluntary small arms and light weapons collection and destruction. 35 These
frameworks became important elements of MI and SSR processes during the 1990s;
however, these frameworks are rarely contextualized by international organizations
outside the discussions of individual peacekeeping missions.
When members of different ethnoreligious communities can come to an
agreement and band behind a collective entity in an attempt to consolidate interests,
reconciliation has a more improved chance of being implemented. 36 Reconciliation,
however, is made difficult when the war in question is ethnoreligious in nature and when
ethnofracturalization is more prevalent, with a pervasive difficulty in consolidating like
interests. A region with many conflicting rival groups wanting to exercise control over a
state is considered fracturalized, and even smaller fiefdom-like communities of a
heterogeneous combination of people will be most difficult to reconcile with under the
terms of formalized negotiation. 37 Negotiations with multiple militia groups are
fundamentally more difficult to be reconciled when the goal is to divide the state during
times of civil war, with more success being found when militia leaders come to a
consensus of preserving the state as a whole entity. 38 Ultimately, civil wars are far less

Joseph Mayer. “Disarmament.” Social Science 38, no. 1 (Jan 1963): 12
35 Ibid., 13.
36 Florian Bieber. “Bosnia-Herzegovina and Lebanon: Historical Lessons of Two Multireligious States.”
Third World Quarterly 21, no. 2 (Apr 2000): 273
37 Ibid., 270.
38 Ibid., 272.
34

14

likely than international wars to come to any formal agreement, with more than a third of
active civil wars reigniting within only a few years of settled peace agreements. This can
be due to the lack of power militia groups will experience when they disarm, losing their
hard power bargaining tool, leaving the state to default on previously agreed upon terms.
This attitude makes militia groups hesitant, enabling them to quickly rearm and continue
expanding violent action and hostilities. The relationship between state and militia, as
well as the relationship between militias, then, is due for acute scrutiny, especially
considering that it was determined that in 2006 there were thirty-two ongoing civil
conflicts that lasted for over three years. 39

39

Glassmyer and Sambanis, “Military Integration…”, 365.
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CHAPTER THREE
THEORY
The framework that this theory occupies lies in between the structure of
comparative politics and international relations as a result of the nature of militias to be
active and present in both discussions, and that the processes with which militia
disarmament is discussed often borrows theories from international relations and other
internationally applied theories 40 despite the state-centric nature of militias. This study
argues that the militias that are more invested in restoring the domestic state and
negotiating the grievances that led to civil war are more likely to elect to disarm as their
interests lie primarily in resolving their domestic tensions. Militias that are deeply
invested in regional rivalries and involvement in broader area conflicts are less likely to
voluntarily disarm. Militias devoted to repairing the domestic regime are more likely to
accept the DDR process, no matter their relative strength or weakness in negotiation. All
militias recognize that participating in civil war is costly and that peace is a more
desirable option. They will opt to willingly engage in DDR and reintegrate into the state
in various roles, be it through joining the military or accepting other means to create an
alternative livelihood, even if it means surrendering arms and being open to personal
violent attack.41 We expect to see militias more involved with foreign entanglements less
likely to choose to disarm, as their interests lie beyond the narrow scope of mending

D. B. Subedi.“Security Dimension of Post-conflict Recovery: Nepal's Experience in Disarmament and
Demobilisation of People's Liberation Army Fighters.” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and
Society 28, no. 2 (2015): 145.
41 Clayton, “Relative rebel strength…”, 610.
40
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internal disputes, but rather engaging in conflict outside of the ideological and territorial
borders of the given state. While many scholars point to understanding disarmament as
simply the first part of the DDR42 processes that militias engage in, 43 it is more salient
than ever to consider the impact of the domestic political sphere and its place in any
particular regional disputes under the international system beyond simply considering
security guarantees that militias face and how “attitudinal” and commitment issues
undermine the peace process.44
Simply examining the aggregate, normative, and operative successes 45 of the
DDR process lacks consideration of the role that larger systems play in the success and
failures of disarmament, as well as the negative peace that is sought after when engaging
in the process of DDR. Militia disarmament can be applied to the various systems or
Waltzian images within the structure of peace negotiations. When war, according to
Waltz, “promotes internal unity of each state involved,” 46 it begs how this understanding
of unity in war can be applied to a militia in its para-state role. Can internal unity be
promoted at Waltz’s interpretation of the second image within a state, when paramilitary
groups and militias operate in a middle ground between the second and third image? If
the second image is the state and its domestic structure, and the third is the international
system at large, a militia or paramilitary group would then seek to operate in both:

Mark Knight and Alpaslan Özerdem. "Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace." Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 4
(2004): 501.
43 Özerdem, “Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration…”, 962.
44 Glassmyer and Sambanis, “Military Integration…”, 368.
45 Subedi, “Security Dimension…”, 145.
46 Kenneth N. Waltz. 1959. Man, the state, and war: a theoretical analysis. New York: Columbia
University Press, 81.
42
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existing without the legitimacy of an internationally recognized state to be discussed in
the context of the third image exclusively, and beholden to the second image and the state
a militia exists and operates within. Considering the superstructure of these different
levels of analysis in the field is necessary to understand the framework within which
disarmament occurs, and is often found missing in most discussions about disarmament
and DDR discussions more broadly. Extrapolating internal unity within a state to apply to
the internal cohesion and solidarity within a militia group is surely appropriate, as militias
operate in between systems. From where, however, is such a unity derived if not from
political components associated with a state, such as identity politics and regime type, or
components that rest in the international sphere, such as alliances and sheer military
strength? It is the actions taken by a militia in the pursuit of their interests and their
conception of where such actions will be applied that provides clarity, delineating their
operation as more pertinent in one image than the other that can create dramatic
differences in the way that militia disarmament scholarship is discussed, and voluntary
disarmament achieved. It is not simply that political science uses these levels of analysis
to discuss the state of global politics and study it in theory. This study implies more
broadly that the Waltzian images and levels of analysis are the only way that the
collective international body and all of its states have operationalized policy solutions to
global political problems, and further that militia violence poses a stark obstacle to this
understanding as the role they fulfill is at odds when interpreted within just the state
system or just the international system. When considering that the foundation of DDR
concepts applied to the cessation of state civil war are derived from preexisting

18

international relations theories which emphasize the role of strategic bargaining and the
security dilemma in defensive realism, 47 it becomes clear that the manner in which
international political solutions have been prescribed and administered are unable to
accurately operate in simply one system to resolve militia violence. It also suggests that
the role that militias play in both systems has not only posed a challenge to theorists
when approaching civil conflict cessation, but that it has also proven to be complex for
the international system through this theoretical framework to address and resolve global
political issues at both levels, and for the state system to provide adequate force to
immobilize militias in particular. Therefore, the framework in which the political world
operates today, unable to account for the nature of militias to occupy both systems,
suggests that militias operate successfully between systems because international efforts
have been ineffective in addressing militias as para-states, leaving them virtually without
any direct, targeted consequences for their actions. It is not that militias do not experience
consequences, but rather that they still manage to persist in the wake of consequences
administered forcefully or legally, which is where concepts such as DDR that borrow
from international relations theory become useful according to scholars.48 Militias do not
inherently act as para-states to avoid being targeted by consequences that are levied upon
them, however, without enough sheer force by the state or without accurate
understanding of their complexity from the international system, they are still able to
operate relatively unaffected. Without any formal framework to address militia violence
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from just a state-up or international system-down perspective, militias have by virtue of
today’s inefficacious approaches taken advantage of this gray area to embolden their
actions. Simply, militias have continued to get away with their actions as their actions
defy any one particular effort. Militias, as I argue, do prefer or subconsciously choose a
system in which to operationalize their interests, within the confines of existing between
the state and international system. Militias who I theorize voluntarily disarm do so in
service to the state and its domestic apparatus, while the militias who do not disarm are at
service to the international system. It simply is how militias adopt the frameworks to
achieve their goals. This study proceeds under such theoretical assumptions.
Scholars have discussed the militia in a variety of conceptions, as being statesupported or simply an rebel or insurgent group. 49 While militias can often become
“controlled or co-opted” by the state or its representatives, militias are clearly able to and
have historically acted independently pursuing their own interests relative to their state,
even if it means their interests attempt to supersede the state. 50 If a militia is gaining its
legitimacy as a valid actor by simply existing in its capacity within its home state, I
theorize that it is likely to voluntarily disarm, and if a militia is gaining its legitimacy
from another international actor, it is likely not to voluntarily disarm. The key to
understanding voluntary disarmament comes from the legitimacy issue of militias, the
same legitimacy issue at the core of every discussion in the international community as it
seeks to administer solutions to eliminate violent militia, paramilitary, or terrorist groups
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as illegitimate actors in the international sphere, while such militias receive strong
domestic support.51 The legitimacy of certain groups in Africa, such as the Lord’s
Resistance Army in Uganda, grew from its ability to mobilize and militarize in an
incredibly formal and organized fashion into surrounding regional activity by mimicking
traditional army techniques.52 While it is undeniably true that the politics of inclusion
plays a large role in mobilizing militias across state borders and into the larger regional
discussion, it is not enough to state categorically that ethnic groups divided across
arbitrary state lines drawn by imperialist powers is the sole reason that certain militias
mobilize across state borders into regional territories to unify. I theorize that it is further
support, monetary or ideologically, from regional influences seeking to achieve their own
interests in a given state and region that provides the legitimacy certain militias hope to
borrow from an external legitimate state operating in the Waltzian third image that is the
key to understanding voluntary militia disarmament, or lack thereof.
Voluntary disarmament is not just simply the product of security dilemma
consequences being applied to militias instead of states in the international system. The
para-state roles that militias can serve in providing services and security to a given
population while simultaneously lacking the ability to maintain a monopoly of force over
a territory means that they are not able to be evaluated simply as states in the
international system. Applying the framework of the security dilemma concept that
inherently imbues DDR processes generally 53 can be helpful in navigating bargaining
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dilemmas and achieving peace, and is what makes examining voluntary disarmament in
militias distinct and worthy of discussion. War is, again, costly to all. If a militia can
transcend the terms of a security dilemma struggle however, as Theory 1 suggests,
simply by being able to exert more military force than other parties, 54 there is no
incentive as to why any militia under any circumstances would want to disarm at all;
there would be especially no incentive to disarm voluntarily. This is often the pitfall of
DDR according to scholars.55 Most important in understanding this phenomenon is that
voluntary disarmament would require willingly giving up the SALW that had enabled
previous defensive or offensive military action, leaving a given militia broadly open to
attack. In this line of thinking, a militia has independently come to the conclusion that
leaving themselves open to vulnerability is somehow advantageous to their interests. The
key, however, is to understand whose will a militia is leaving themselves vulnerable to,
the host state or regional influences - respective to which level they seek to achieve their
interests at. As authors discuss alternative examples, Afghanistan, Uganda, Nepal and
others,56 none discuss what would incentivize voluntary disarmament or even distinguish
it apart from simply a willingness to agree to terms of peace and disarm, a step that
already exists in the normal DDR process.57 I theorize that an innate, and potentially
ideological, commitment to a domestic state apparatus is the key to transcend the security
dilemma in these cases, irrespective of inherent militia strength. If a militia’s goals are
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the preservation of the domestic structure and regime of the state, a militia will as a result
be willing to agree to an altered or adjusted status quo, especially if it implies that a
militia can enjoy the retention and maintenance of as much of the pre-war status quo as
possible. It is the status quo that is most significant to such militias that voluntarily
disarm, even if it is practiced as simply adherence to a domestic ideological practice, or
even if they believe they are fighting against the status quo; this study implies that
capitulation to the state, willingly, indicates an ideological commitment to some ever
present form of regime operations or system of government. Simply put, a commodity
inherent in the state as it was prior to the outbreak of conflict is deemed as worth fighting
for by militias, and it is possible that this commodity is at the core foundations of a state's
regime, or heritage and ideology that permeated it perhaps.
This is precisely when militias will be likely to voluntarily disarm, because a
domestic structure plays a significant role in the legitimacy that a state can maintain and
bring to an international stage, whereas a militia can only ever operate under its looming
shadow even if it attempts or hopes to supersede it. Militias that are unlikely to
voluntarily disarm, however, are those whose interests are intending to do just that:
supersede. It lies at the heart of state legitimacy. A militia who is likely to voluntarily
disarm is therefore doing so in the service of the state, demonstrating the significance of
sovereign and international legitimacy that no militia, no matter how hard they try, can
bypass or overcome without enormous regional and international system modifications. If
a militia is operating in broader efforts to restore state processes, willing to accept a
modified status quo as success, committing to the state’s legitimacy and choosing to
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capitulate may be the only way to achieve success in their efforts and purpose. 58 This can
occur even after acknowledging that there is no method in which achieving peace can
lead to any semblance of the former status quo pre-conflict, but that the state regime’s
existence, especially in regions where states only have relatively young national
histories,59 can represent a status quo of sorts, especially in the long term history of the
region and the forces who occupy it. 60
Success, for militias that are invested in the domestic political structure, can
therefore be understood as maintaining the status quo is as close as it was previously, not
to the benefit of the state necessarily, but to the benefit of the militia itself. This leads to a
discussion of particular interest: how militias strive to maintain a semblance of status quo
in the wake of a conflict within the confines of a state with a fractured, power-sharing
system of government.61 It is such a government structure that creates domestic rifts
capable of igniting support for militias that seek to accomplish their ideological goals and
maintain a favorable domestic status that the members of a militia enjoyed pre-war. They
seek to maintain their interests through the system as a pre-existing state structure, or an
ideological unity and commitment to common identity that is concurrently reflected at the
core of a state’s ideology or regime. This dedication to the state, I argue, would compel a
militia to lay down arms in the face of even potential harm. I theorize that it is not a
power-sharing system at odds with a monopoly of legitimate force that creates the
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dichotomy between the actions of militias who choose to disarm and those who do not. 62
It is also not simply the exploitation of a power-sharing political system that endows
militias dedicated to regional rivalries to choose not to disarm.63 I argue, rather, that
various militias are engaging in conflict due to different conceptions of power-sharing or
legitimate force monopoly, exacerbated as a result of the middle ground that militias
occupy in the world as too consequential to be ignored at the international level, but not
legitimate enough to be a state in its own right.
If it is accepted that a militia likely to voluntarily disarm is by extension fighting
for state unity, it can be accordingly theorized that it is fighting against militias who
believe in the dissolution of the current regime or state itself potentially in service to
another dominant regional power’s interests or larger regional ideology. Militias who
voluntarily disarm have, therefore, simply served as an extension of the state to some
capacity. Allowing a state to engage in conflict against militias who serve other interests
outside the preservation of the domestic status quo, through a proxy group with less
legitimacy than that of the state that is nonetheless dedicated to its continued existence,
provides the state an opportunity to achieve its interests. A state will be able to rival less
favorable militias without suffering the global consequences of exercising a
disproportionate use of force against select groups less favorable to its own interests, and
liberates a state from condemnation for any brutality enacted by such militias. This would
allow militias invested in maintaining the state structure to confront other militias that do
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not have a commitment to the state and have broader regional aspirations and interests.
While these militias committed to the domestic sphere, virtually allow it to fight for itself
in this illegitimate arena against what the state views as other illegitimate militias, such a
relationship is not simply a state-sponsored militia fighting against non-state sponsored
militias. A militia that voluntarily disarms is therefore further demonstrated to be a
conception of an ideological purpose that can be militarized and is incentivized by
maintaining or fighting for a status quo and an existing system. Of course, a state is able
to recognize with rigorous risk analysis if sponsoring a militia will be favorable to its
fundamental existence or not, but it is possible that a particular militia dedicated to a state
status quo is simply unaware that by fighting for the status quo, they are inherently
fighting for the state in the face of other militias whose intentions are more broadly
regional. Fighting for a united state identity within any country could further be inherent
to the very state’s status quo itself.
Militias dedicated to the whims of other state sponsors or broader regional
conflict, external to the state, are less likely to voluntarily disarm as the conception of a
state status quo is not only ignored, but likely in the process of being actively
undermined. Militias often are, however, acting independent of their home state and
towards their own interests. 64 A militia’s commitment to a state can then be interpreted in
two ways for the purpose of this study: as the remuneration of external state sponsorship
and the interests of the patron state, or inherently drawn from a commitment to the
domestic system and regime native to the state it operates within. Such a commitment can
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certainly stem from an ideological motivation on the surface but ultimately stems from a
desire to seek the maintenance of the status quo or its complete subversion. The conflict
between the levels of analysis and its relation to this theorized middle sphere between the
domestic and regional/international images where militias operate is not lost on the
understanding of militia goals. While a militia may not inherently recognize that it is
operating in this middle ground to the extent that the literature underscores it, the
dichotomy between status quo and its subversion clearly demonstrate that militias,
through ideology or otherwise, seek either a binding of security and stability for members
and a commitment to a state, or a broader promise of regional political power and
influence.
Theory 1 posits that relatively strong paramilitary groups, relative to that of the
state, are liberated from the strategic bargaining elements of negotiations, therefore,
making peace less likely to be achieved. 65 By extension, such militias will choose not to
disarm due to their ability to transcend settlement terms; these militias have significant
leverage over their counterparts, and can still hold out when the government can
potentially renege on settlement terms. Relatively strong militias may overinflate their
capacities and rely on a perception of strength and capability, leaving other militias up to
the whims of the relatively strong militia. While there is a significant discussion on the
role of mediation being more likely to lead to peace the more powerful a militia group
is,66 I argue instead that it is the intentions of the militia group at the precipice of
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disarmament that can make even the most relatively capable and powerful militias choose
to lay down arms willingly, and not simply the ability or militant strength that a militia
would bring to negotiations. Enabling any semblance of the status quo to return and
maintaining a principal commitment to the state structure is enough to allow a militia to
willingly risk the consequences of disarmament if it capacitates their interests within the
domestic structure and their larger ideological interests thereto, even if such a militia is
the most militarily capable and powerful with potential to supercede negotiations.
Theory 2 claims that insurgent groups rely on a fractured domestic system of
politics; militias will seek legitimacy by exploiting a power-sharing and deeply divided
regime structure to shield themselves from broader international condemnation to disarm,
and to be perceived as an active member of the state’s civil society. This can be
established as a method to maintain its presence in the state after negotiations while
maintaining their collection of arms and the potential for future militarization, with the
best likelihood to achieve their goal through domestic political means rather than
maintain the support of other states and regional actors.67 While this theory is incredibly
accurate to the examined case of Lebanon in the years following the war, its application
to the understanding of civil war contexts at large lacks a discussion on international
legitimacy. I argue that the militia groups that choose not to disarm, in their inability to
seek the legitimacy inherent to statehood, are outwardly approached and contracted by
other regional actors to advance their own interests, providing a stronger sense of
legitimacy in its desire to subvert the status quo and act upon their regional rivalries and
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interests. The inherently fractured nature of a power-sharing system cannot provide
robust legitimacy when the interests of a militia lie in the regional and, as a result, the
international realm. Support and funding for action by a regional patron allows for
militias to borrow legitimacy from regional hegemons to accrue more perceived power,
arms, and other tools needed to achieve their interests. This transactional relationship
between militia and patron state allows regional powers to occupy the middle ground
between the state sphere and the international one and to shield a militia’s international
status. This legitimacy borrowing can possibly shield a militia from broader international
disapproval, however, it can also paradoxically magnify its actions globally becoming
more recognizable in the international sphere and more at risk to open condemnation by
other global powers.
Scholars point to other examples of militia disarmament processes. Many states
struggle, given a power-sharing system, on how to structure a united government regime
while accounting for categorical differences. In considering Nigeria, even among their
many non-state actors during their civil war, none were acting on behalf of another state,
and none of the actors, generally, were acting out of foreign influence or in the interests
of another state specifically. Additionally, many civil wars experience "systematic"
disarmament of militias, where disarmament can vary in different fashions among the
actors themselves, and where the understanding of various different types or groups of
militias were deemed structurally distinct from one another. 68A general similarity in all
other cases is that at any given time during their civil war, they did not experience
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multiple69 distinct militia groups where the argument for the unification of a state was
placed in contrast to blatant regional influence and infiltration. Acknowledging these
cases allows for more variables to be controlled when examining the independent
variables in the presented case.
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CHAPTER FOUR
METHODS
This study examines seven distinct militias operating during the Lebanese civil
war, utilizing the method of difference approach to determine the causal relationships
between commitment to a domestic structure or regional involvement in determining
whether militias choose to voluntarily disarm or not. The choice of militias for the
purposes of this article is best suited to understand the different interests in choosing to
obtain arms and militarize during the civil war, ethnoreligious ties to Lebanese people,
and use of the existing Lebanese regime structure during the civil war to achieve their
respective interests. 70 There are categorical elements that underscore what a militia in the
context of the Lebanese civil war is defined as. They will be continuously observed
across all examined militias in this article. They will be used to make clear the strong
similarities among all militias in an attempt to account for any other factor as a possible
alternative to this study. They include militia’s access to SAWL and fractured powersharing domestic regimes.
The first component of note is the access and use of small arms and light weapons
(SALW), weapons that can be considered sold, traded and purchased among people,
states and organizations. The second component is a fractured domestic political system,
in which a power-sharing structure is emphasized among many different rival
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ethnoreligious groups. This can be as simple as maintaining quotas in parliaments for
gender or other identity-related labels, however, in this case, it is best defined as a system
in which many parties, adherent to a given ideology, kin group, or ethnicity, all struggle
to agree to a fair regime structure in which to advocate best for their interests. 71
The independent variable is foreign involvement and backing of militias by an
external, and in this case regional, state. Foreign involvement and backing will be
understood as ideological, monetary or military support, tacit or explicit, by another state
in order to achieve the state’s own benefit. For this research, this study excludes other
non-state actors such as the PLO 72 and focuses solely on legitimate regional states,
including Syria and Iran. The variable will serve in examining the maintenance of support
before, during, and after the DDR process and the agreement on a peace settlement.
Foreign involvement can be wildly varied; however, sticking to the concepts of the
maintenance of foreign entanglement during and beyond the DDR process is key in
analyzing this variable.
While the main variable of question is the foreign entanglements of militias or
lack thereof, this study takes into account examination of ethnoreligious questions as
inherently important to the discussion of a power-sharing system. Ethnoreligious
subdivisions are nuanced in Lebanon, but for the purposes of this study, these groups will
be considered ethnically Arab, as ethnicity is difficult to define.73 Lebanese militias were
largely and significantly composed of a particular religious group, with some other
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members of different religious groups being incorporated into a militia with a different
religious identity at times.74 These militia groups will be associated with their dominant
religious makeup and identification.
The dependent variable is voluntary or involuntary disarmament. Disarmament is
defined as a “process that targets a determinate number of combatants, whether as
individual or groups, belonging to the Armed Forces or armed opposition groups, in order
to disarm, demilitarize and reintegrate these persons into civilian life, the Armed Forces
or the police.”75 It is concerned with the process of giving up SALW, including any
explosives or additional ammunition. 76 To operationalize voluntary disarmament, this
study defines it as a process by which militia groups voluntarily opt to hand over their
collected small arms and light weapons and accept reintegration, without being pressured
to do so by another state outside the realm of formal negotiation processes.77
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CHAPTER FIVE
CASE STUDY: THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR AND ITS ORIGINS
After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the terms of the Sykes-Picot agreement
were initiated at the hands of the League of Nations. France exercised control over the
territory of Syria and Lebanon in the Levant. France’s deeply rooted fiscal and friendly
relationship with the Maronite Christians of Mount Lebanon, even prior to the fall of the
Ottoman Empire, inspired the Maronites to align with the West as they continued the
process of state formation. When creating the new borders of Greater Lebanon,
incorporating other Muslim-majority territorial holdings, a Census was taken in 1932 to
survey the population breakdown of the territory of the future Lebanese Republic. The
questions asked ranged from standard questions such as age and sex; however, the most
essential and noteworthy question was that of religion. Looking at the results, 227,800
respondents identified as Maronite, 178,100 identified as Sunni, and 155,035 identified as
Shia, thus making the Maronites the dominant religious population. The totality of the
Christian population constituted around 51% of the total population, by incorporating
Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Protestants, and other smaller religious sects. 78 With
the creation of the state, the rights of immigrants to vote was revoked, and a parliament of
55 seats was established, 30 allocated to Christians and 25 allocated to Muslims.79 This
6:5 ratio of parliamentary seats would become the most hotly contested issue in the civil
war to come. The unwritten National Pact of 1943 was then agreed to by a handshake
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between Christian and Muslim politicians, with France’s ultimate authority. The pact
called for a Maronite President, a Sunni Prime Minister, and a Shia Speaker of
Parliament.80 On November 8, 1943, the Chamber of Deputies passed many acts formally
undoing the verbiage of France's sole authority, changed the official language back to
simply Arabic, and adopted the modern-day Lebanese flag design. Thus, Lebanon was an
independent state, engaging in a complex power-sharing regime structure. Tensions after
the establishment of the state were present, but not in stark prevalence. A firm
commitment to the state with its newfound independence was assumed, 81 despite Syriac
nationalism on the rise in the eastern and southern regions. As Israel declared its
independence in 1948, the population of Palestinians migrating to Lebanon was visibly
tipping the scale of religious composition in the country to favor Muslim interests.
Tensions steadily rose until the mid 1970s, when the Palestinians were expelled from
Jordan and set up in Lebanon. This led to the formation of many militias actively trying
to expel, or sustain, the PLO. 82
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CHAPTER SIX
MILITIAS AND DISARMEMENT
The formation of the Lebanese Forces came as a result of the unity of many
different Christian militia factions,83 two of which being Tanzim and the Kataeb. Fighting
among the many factions was common until Bachir Gemayel united the Maronite militias
into one paramilitary group later on in the war. 84 Marada was also a member of the
Lebanese Forces until it defected and allied closely with Syria. The Kataeb, notably, were
focused on fighting the PLO, which was the sole impetus for its creation - the CIA stated
that the ultimate goal of the Kataeb was “...to maintain an independent Lebanon under
Maronite hegemony and thus ensure that Lebanon will never be dominated by Muslims
or absorbed into the Arab world.”85 As militia member 1 states: “When we joined, we
were worried about the power the [Maronite] Christians would lose if we did not act. Our
influence would vanish if more and more mostly Muslim Palestinians would come across
the border. It would have tipped the political scale.” Critically, the Kataeb were dedicated
to a Lebanese state.86 They were also the most powerful militia at the time, well
organized with around 40,000 members. While its relationship with Israel is not disputed,
Israel's interest in eliminating the PLO is in line with the interests of the Kataeb, but for
simply different reasons. Seeking international support for a domestic cause, the Kataeb
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focused on the Christian/Muslim divide, discussing the incompatibility of “Muslims, who
are consciously allowed to live only in an Islamic state ruled by Muslim law...with
Christians as second-class citizens.”87 This demonstrates that the support from regional
states does not theoretically imply a larger commitment to external rivalries and tending
to the interests of a regional patron. Israel and the Kataeb had a common enemy, but for
drastically different reasons. The Kataeb were simply dedicated to the domestic sphere
and were clearly acting in commitment to a status quo of maintaining Christian
hegemony and representation in the Lebanese power-sharing structure.
Alongside them, the eager and disciplined forces of al-Tanzim proved themselves
to be of utmost importance to war efforts. Their skillfulness in war was extremely wellregarded, and they were an incredibly strong militia, with 14,000 organized and trained
members.88 They also advocated for the elimination of the PLO in the same way that the
Kataeb as well as Israel wanted, bolstering an extremely efficacious relationship. Militia
member 1 states, “They were so well trained. [The] first gun us hillbillies had access to
was a revolver from Venezuela that a Tanzim guy convinced the Maronite Patriarch to
bring back on a flight inside of a food processor box.” Unlike the Kataeb who had always
relied on a singular figurehead for power, al-Tanzim was very dedicated to creating a
council for decision making within the militia - the first of its kind seen in any Lebanese
militia. This was intended to provide power to the largest number of people. 89 Al-Tanzim
was made up of mostly Maronite and few Greek Orthodox fighters; it demonstrates
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clearly that while the Christian groups fought for mostly Maronite hegemony, Maronite
Christians had to seek alliances with other Christian groups to advance their interest of
eliminating the PLO, the main disruptor of the status quo.90 Al-Tanzim’s singular purpose
was to eliminate the PLO, and at times was frustrated with working with the Kataeb due
to a perception that they were not “doing enough.” 91 Their creation, splintered from the
Kataeb, was due to their desire to see active military exercises of the Lebanese in their
militia to “counter the Palestinian threat,” while they percieved their Kataeb counterparts
to be dragging their feet.92 After reluctantly accepting weapons from whomever they
could, including Syria, al-Tanzim along with all other operating Christian militias
determined after the Tal-al-Zaatar siege (1976) that organizing together under one large
militia would be the most effective method to achieve their goals of maintaining
Christian hegemony and by extension a commitment to a Lebanese state. 93
Unlike the other Christian militias I examine, Marada is a distinct case, and it is
included to highlight that religious affiliation is not a confounding variable in the choice
of whether or not to voluntarily disarm. A band of security guards for former president
Suleiman Frangieh, Marada’s militia branch, also known as the Zgharta Liberation Army,
is in this manner distinct in its ideological stance and ultimate goals from the other
Christian groups. While at first allied with other Christian militias, Marada’s funding
eventually became solely provided by Syria in a transactional relationship. 94 In
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Frangieh’s attempts to secure the Zgharta fiefdom, where he was from and personally
connected to, he felt that the only way to see his local community secured during the
unsteady nature of the civil war was to engage in a transactional relationship with Syria,
particularly after critiquing the activity between other Christian militias, made
particularly pertinent after Christian forces killed his son, Tony Frangieh, and his
family.95 This made him particularly weary about a future Lebanese state, and he had
incentive to believe that his community could stand to benefit from regional intervention
in the long term as a result. 96Marada’s relationship with Syria was noted officially in the
record after Tony Frangieh’s assasination, and is demonstrated clearly when Rifaat Assad
and Abdel-Halim Khaddam, the Syrian Special Forces commander and Syrian Foreign
Minister respectively, apologized and, “offered official condolences on behalf of Syria
and President Assad to Suleiman Frangieh.” Syrian troops then advanced into Northern
Lebanon, cornering the Christian militia stronghold, and exacting revenge on behalf of
Frangieh. Syrian troops entered into villages in the north of the Bekaa Valley and
dragged “thirty-six Lebanese citizens, twelve of whom were Kataeb members, out of
their beds ‘for questioning.’ The very next day, villagers found the horrifically mutilated
and mangled bodies of the arrested young men with their hands tied behind their backs in
the nearby bush of Wadi al-Rayyan.”97In remarking on the tragedy, a speech by former
president Camille Chamoun stated, “that those who carried out the operation are neither
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Lebanese nor civil.”98 It is precisely such support and revenge from Syria exacted on
behalf of Marada that demonstrates an action of clear support from a regional influence
towards a militia. In return, Marada was loyal to Syria and acted within pro-Syrian
interests throughout the duration of the war in the name of Tony Frangieh. Marada had
been promised larger influence in the country post-Taif by being allied with Syria;
Syria’s occupation of Lebanon post-Taif served as the most powerful evidence to Marada
that the right decision to abandon their Christian compatriots was made. With the heavy
Syrian influence on the Taif Accords, their arms were maintained well beyond the end of
the peace treaty. While they visibly did agree to DDR terms, they were able to do so
knowing that their patron was holding the reins. 99 The Kataeb and Tanzim, on the other
hand, quickly agreed to a Taif settlement and engaged wholly in the DDR process. While
their willingness to voluntarily disarm stemmed from many reasons, including the
infighting between the groups demonstrated above and the ultimate goal of seeing a
Maronite Christian president of the state was maintained, Marada’s personal reasoning
for maintaining regional patron support in spite of their other Christian militias was due
to its newfound “privileged relations with Syria,” seeking to undermine the Lebanese
state and subvert the status quo in favor of a Syrian controlled state. 100
Amal was the preeminent Shia Muslim militia in the civil war landscape. Its
original function was serving in a political role to advocate for the poor, predominantly
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Shia, communities in Lebanon that were not receiving adequate social services. 101 This
comes as a direct result of their lack of inclusion into the discussions of the national
pact102 during state creation. Additionally, any desires historically of trying to unify Shia
communities in solidarity were systematically crippled due to the geographic distance
between major Shia strongholds.103 With support from Syria, Amal fought in the civil
war against the PLO and against Hezbollah, an organization that grew after defectors
from Amal were dissatisfied with leader Nabih Berri’s influence and refusal to back the
PLO, all while advocating for broader Shia respect and representation. 104Amal's process
of disarmament was unique. When it agreed to the terms of the Taif Accords, Amal was
able to maintain its arms through some Hezbollah support in private. Amal is considered
to have voluntarily disarmed when over half of its former militiamen willingly joined the
Lebanese Army in the year after Taif was negotiated. 105 They ultimately completed the
DDR process willingly due to their desire to reintegrate into the army and dedicate
themselves to the state structure, a dedication founded from their interests to advocate for
the Shia population. Their goal was to provide for the downtrodden of Lebanon, and
therefore demonstrate dedication to the state and domestic affairs over regional
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rivalries.106 Militia member 2 stated, “...they were really conflicted. It took them a year or
so of going back and forth and trying to determine if they wanted to take the [jobs with
the army]. They did what was best for them when they all joined the military, but
Hezbollah held their weapons, almost as a show of Shia solidarity. That solidarity really
went far for them.” It was the Amal Movement’s ability to advocate for the
representation of Shia interests by willingly disarming and joining the military that
indicates their actions were committed to a Lebanese state, despite Syrian military
support demonstrated in the same fashion as Israeli support for the Christians.
The Mourabitoun were a part of the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), and
were a Nasserist and Pan-Arabist militia group, predominantly composed of Sunni and
some Shia Muslims; however, its ideology was to maintain a secular Lebanese state, and
by extension, a secular Middle East. Members adhered strictly to the wisdom of Gamal
Abdel Nasser, but were not committed to the Egyptian state, as it sought to see Lebanon
be a strong part of the Arab world, rather than affiliating with the West. Their
commitment to the state is best seen in their vehement opposition to former president
Camille Chamoun, an advocate of maintaining the Christian political hegemony in
Lebanon.107 The goal of the Mourabitoun was to bring secularism to Lebanon, and they
did so by advocating a pan-Arab ideological secularism.108 Their commitment to the
Lebanese state was more substantial than their commitment to Egyptian thought or other
Arab states, evidenced by their appearance to the Taif Accords and engaging in the DDR
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process willingly. Additionally, they militarily engaged Kataeb forces most notably in
1976 and partitioned East and West Beirut to indicate their dissatisfaction with religious
intervention in the war and to bolster their ideals that secularism, not religious zeal, was
to be the most effective way to resolve tensions and administer the state after tensions
cooled.109 Their most significant victory at Taif is the phrasing that now rests in the
Lebanese constitution, “Lebanon is an Arab country, both by kinship, and identity.”110
This state identity that was so key to their mission clearly demonstrates their commitment
to a Lebanese state, and additionally a Lebanese government, and is ultimately why they
chose to voluntarily disarm.
Hezbollah’s existence as an organization in Lebanon is as a result of an offshoot
of the Amal movement, which members of Hezbollah deemed as too secular. Militia
member 2 claims,
“Hezbollah was able to apply a religious zeal that Amal was lacking. Amal was
committed to a Lebanese state, but Hezbollah’s success came from its desire to
undermine the state. It was able to use the Shia people’s desperation and poverty and
commit them to their ideology disguised as strict adherence to faith. The Christians did
that too, I felt the same commitment to Christianity, not as a faith, but as a commitment
to a Lebanon ruled by those who believed as I did. Psychology plays a role in this, and
Hezbollah used that psychology to pull supporters from Amal. It was revolutionary, in
the same way that Khomeini was a revolutionary in Iran.”
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Such statements further demonstrate the desire for undermining the status quo, seeking to
achieve broader international interests, or at the least willingly assist in helping the
Iranian state achieve their own. Additionally, the reasoning for the breakaway from Amal
serves as direct support to their regional interests: a direct result of Ayatollah Khomeini’s
desire to see Shia Muslims fighting Israel at the southern Lebanese border and placing a
militia in the role of a para-state to act beyond the borders of Lebanon itself. 111 The
dedication of Hezbollah to serve as an Iranian puppet militia firstly, and Shia secondly, 112
only serves to reinforce the theory at the center of this research: that their unwillingness
to disarm is linked to involvement in regional rivalries between Iran and Israel. It is as a
result that during the Taif Accords, Hezbollah was not even considered a “militia,” but
rather, a group of freedom fighters, or, “Pro-Khomeini street mobs.”113 This
categorization was purposeful: it masked Hezbollah's intentions as a militia with
international intentions, and Iran’s influence in the Taif negotiations 114 ensured that their
role was not even considered committed to either a domestic Lebanese state or a regional
power, and its categorization as simply a group of armed bandits, with some publicly
vague association to Iran allowed it to remain armed. It was Iran’s influence that secured
such a status for Hezbollah, demonstrating yet another method of support that foreign
patron states provide militias in their transactional relationship. At the time, Hezbollah’s
strength was, “limited to what guns Syria let Iran pass over the border,” recalls militia
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member 1, further highlighting the notion that it is not simply an issue of bargaining
capabilities, but rather intention that determined Hezbollah’s global perception when it
was party to the Taif negotiations. Hezbollah chose not to disarm, the only militia to do
so in a visible manner.115 Most importantly, it was exempt from having to disarm at Taif
categorically, however, it was due to its patronage from Iran that allowed it to supersede
disarmament, and not its military capacity or exploitation of the fractured domestic
system.
The Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), while considered secular, is composed of
an almost entirely Druze membership. Their paramilitary wing, the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) was known to rival the Christian militias actively and was considered their
counterpart in terms of sheer strength. Their involvement with the Lebanese National
Movement (LNM) bonded the PSP to Syria. Much like Marada, the PSP voluntarily
disarmed and entertained the DDR process, however, its commitment to the negotiations
was limited to just that: entertaining the notion while secretly pursuing its interests with
regional support.116 PSP’s relationship with Syria allowed it to maintain these weapons
covertly, and receive constant support from Syria considering their role in the peace
process, and while these weapons were maintained in private, it was an open secret that
they were maintained in the very same fashion as Marada. Syria’s influence and capacity
to secure the PSP’s arms in such a commitment to Syrian interests demonstrates further
that foreign entanglement allowed them to usurp disarmament, and choose to not
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voluntarily disarm while maintaining the image of having simply done so as a part of
agreeing to Taif negotiations. 117

Table 1.1. Matrix of Militias, Religious Affiliation, Foreign Support and Disarmament

Militia

Religious

Foreign

Regional

Disarm?

Composition/Affiliation

Support

Relationships

Amal

Shia Muslim

Yes

Syria

Yes

Hezbollah

Shia Muslim

Yes

Iran

No

Kataeb

Maronite Christian

Yes

/

Yes

Marada

Maronite Christian

Yes

Syria

No

Mourabitoun

Sunni Muslim/Secular

No

/

Yes

Progressive

Druze/Secular

Yes

Syria

No

Maronite Christian

Yes

/

Yes

Socialist Party
(PSP)

al-Tanzim
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CHAPTER SEVEN
DISCUSSION
It is evident that some militias who clearly voluntarily disarmed had support from
international actors, however it is important to restate that there were intentions by certain
militias to usurp the domestic regime of the state, as well as intentions in acting upon
interests of militias to see a maintained power-sharing Lebanese government and, more
broadly, a preservation of the Lebanese state. Within the complex network of a civil war
such as Lebanon’s with other violent non-state actors and legitimate state supported army
groups, international support was readily given to almost all groups, but as I have proven,
it is the intentions of the militias that delineated voluntary disarmament or choosing to
maintain arms and not simply the support given that determines disarmament in such
fashion. The Kataeb and Tanzim were fighting against an enemy clearly demonstrated to
have been seen as a perceived risk in the change of the domestic status quo, irrespective
of the Israeli and Western support both militias received. Furthermore, Amal’s
commitment to the state apparatus despite its generalized support from Syria is what
caused it to ultimately voluntarily disarm; it’s commitment to the Lebanese state was
simply stronger and deemed more useful to achieve its interests. As a result, the domestic
status quo was perceived to be the most effective way to advocate for the Shia population
underserved by the government and to achieve their interests within the structure of the
state.
All militias clearly managed to acquire weapons or had them provided by an
international actor. It remains consistent, however, that the intention behind the use of
such weapons in fulfilling militia interests is what led to the voluntary or involuntary
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disarmament among Lebanese militias. While some militias that voluntarily disarmed
were provided weapons by regional and in some cases non-regional actors, it was still the
interests of militias that determined disarmament, even if provided weapons by a foreign
state. Simply providing weapons is not enough to assume a transactional relationship
with a patron state or a particular interest in the subversion of the domestic structure.
Nevertheless, in the case for the militias who did voluntarily disarm and had weapons
provided by external states, the intention was determined to be in maintaining the state
system and its accompanying status quo.
When considering the power-sharing structure of Lebanon, ethnoreligious conflict
was of course present, however, religion was not determined to be a confounding variable
in the militias who did and did not voluntarily disarm. Militias found to voluntarily
disarm were not exclusive to one ethnoreligious group, with both Muslim and Christian
groups found to have done so. Religion was not determined to be a variable of note in
examining a militia’s choice of voluntary disarmament. Eliminating its potential
confounding nature to the discussion adds credence to the theory that it is not the makeup
of the militia, nor the religious conflict between such groups in a power-sharing system
that determined voluntary disarmament, confirming that indeed it is the manner in which
states approach their interests in commitment to domestic state structure or broader
regional interests and subverting the state itself that determines whether militias chose to
voluntarily disarm.
If we expected that a militia had interests most closely associated with the
domestic political sphere according to this theory, we should have observed that these

48

groups chose to disarm. Mourabitoun, Amal, Tanzim, and Kataeb voluntarily disarmed in
the formal DDR process. Since we observe that the Mourabitoun, Amal, Tanzim, and
Kataeb did voluntarily disarm during the Taif Accords, therefore, the theory is confirmed.
If we expected that a militia had interests in line with regional rivalries and disputes
outside the boundaries of the given state, then we should have observed that Hezbollah,
Marada and the PSP choose not to disarm. Marada and the PSP diplomatically stated they
disarmed, but, in fact, chose not to do so, while Hezbollah chose not to disarm entirely.
Since we observe that these militias did not disarm, therefore, the theory is confirmed.
In opposition to Theory 1, the right-wing Maronite Christian Kataeb were
dedicated to disarming, and, as has been mentioned, chose to voluntarily disarm, despite
being the most powerful singular militia. If we expected a militia to be strong enough to
overcome the bargaining issue within a peace settlement, then we would expect them to
choose not to disarm. We observe that the Kataeb were by far the most capable of
overcoming the bargaining issue because of their strength, but we observe that they chose
to disarm anyway. Therefore, rival Theory 1 is disconfirmed.
If we expected a fractured domestic system of government, then we should see a
militia actively involved in regional rivalries to use the domestic structure of a country to
maintain their arms. We observe that Hezbollah, Marada and the PSP were involved in
regional rivalries and maintained their guns, but did not use the fractured political system
to maintain their arms, and rather relied on external state influences to maintain their
stronghold. Therefore, rival Theory 2 is disconfirmed.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSION
This study examined the conditions under which militias choose to disarm, and
posited that under the conditions of a militia being more dedicated to the realm of
domestic politics rather than wrapped up in regional rivalries and external conflict, we
should expect to see such militias choose to disarm. Since it is observed that the
Mourabitoun, Amal, Tanzim, and Kataeb did choose to disarm during formal negotiation
processes to end the war, whereas Hezbollah, Marada and the PSP did not, this theory is
proven correct. Additionally, while some militias publically disarmed while maintaining
a meager stockpile of arms, they ultimately chose to disarm to receive the benefits
inherent to a commitment to the state that would be gained by accepting the terms of the
Taif accords, such as Amal.
Limitations of this study can be found in the sample selection of militias. While
many militias existed in different iterations of the war, and while alliances came and
went, additional investigation of other larger militia alliances such as the Lebanese
Forces could glean more insight on the topics explored. Inclusion of other smaller militias
could also enhance the discussion, as there were as many as nineteen different militias
operating throughout the civil war years in various iterations. Additionally, The Army of
Free Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces were key militant groups in the civil war,
and while they were not militias in the same manner as the others discussed, notably due
to their officially state-sanctioned practice, the politics that underpinned their actions was
similar to that of the other militias discussed in the study. The PLO was also an enormous
50

influence in the proceedings of the war, but was excluded from study as it operated as a
pseudo-state within Lebanon with its own external motivations beyond the state itself and
no singular commitment to the state at any capacity. Future areas of research could be
hypothetically focused on the arrangement of militias and the agreements and defections
of alliances within the civil war.
It is also possible that other confounding variables may be missing from this
analysis. While these variables were selected to optimize the understanding of civil war
militia disarmament, there can be many ways that voluntary disarmament is defined.
While there is a plethora of circumstantial evidence in many articles written during the
civil war of militia disarmament, the only way to understand voluntary disarmament in
concrete terms of engagement is within the DDR process. If a militia’s ultimate goal was
to enjoy the benefits of the reintegration aspects of DDR, it can be understood as
voluntary since terms of reintegration and involvement in the domestic political
landscape are directly linked. In using a method of difference, this comparative approach
allowed narrative case study discussion to be incorporated into the disarmament
literature. This approach can be applied to the understanding of disarmament in civil
wars, and would be less asymmetrical than assuming that the failure of disarmament is
due to a lack of a particular cause that led to the success of disarmament later in time. In
order to do this, it is necessary to examine militias in coordinated timelines. The
implications for the willingness to disarm voluntarily can prove effective in creating more
advantageous disarmament strategy and influencing policy choices in the future. Further
study is, however, still necessary.
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